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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Has Spencer presented any evidence justifying a modifi-
cation or change in the Industrial Commission's May 29, 1985, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order denying permanent total 
disability? 
» 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78, (1981) determines the outcome of 
this case. The relevant portion states: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over 
each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to 
time make such modification or change with respect to 
former findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in 
its opinion may be justified. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission. 
This case arises under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
Carl J. Spencer ("Spencer") filed an application for hearing on 
November 7, 1983, claiming temporary total disability after 
September 9, 1983, permanent partial disability, and permanent 
total disability (R. 56). An evidentiary hearing was held on 
June 1, 1984 (R. 63). The medical panel filed its report on 
December 21, 1984 (R. 255). On February 1, 1985, Spencer filed 
objections to the medical panel report (R. 268) and a Motion 
for Tentative Finding of Entitlement to Permanent Total 
Disability Benefits (R. 272). 
On May 29, 1985, Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen 
entered the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
("Original Order"). He denied Spencer's medical panel objec-
tions and rejected a finding of tentative permanent total 
disability. He also denied temporary total disability beyond 
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September 9, 1983 (R. 303-307). When Spencer did not file a 
Motion for Review, it became final on June 17, 1985. 
One month later, on July 18, 1985, Spencer filed a second 
Application for Hearing again claiming permanent total dis-
ability as well as additional medical expenses (R. 312, 377). 
To support this claim, a St. Mark's Hospital emergency record 
for a January 1985 emergency room visit (R. 331-335) and a July 
1985 Division of Rehabilitation Services ("DRS") report were 
submitted (R. 313-330). The medical expenses were incurred 
four months before Judge Allen's May, 1985 order. The the DRS 
report was made one month after the Original Order became final. 
On November 15, 1985, Judge Allen entered an Order finding 
that the St. Mark's January 1985 emergency treatment resulted 
when Spencer tripped and fell in January 1985 and thus was not 
a result of the 1982 industrial accident. Judge Allen also 
found no change in Spencer's condition since the Original Order 
and denied the second claim of permanent total disability 
(R. 343, 344). Spencer moved for reconsideration of this order 
(R. 346-352) which was unanimously denied by the Industrial 
Commission on January 2,1986. (R. 361). Spencer then moved on 
January 16, 1986, for reconsideration of the denial of his 
first motion for reconsideration (R. 363-366). With this 
second motion a report of Dr. Wayne M. Hebertsen was 
submitted. R. 367-371). On February 3, 1986, Spencer 
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submitted a report of Dr. Patricia Legant (R. 377-379) and 
filed his Petition for Writ of Review with this Court. (R. 
380). On March 17, 1986, the Industrial Commission unanimously 
denied Spencer's second motion for reconsideration. (R. 
384-388) . 
B. Statement of the Facts 
On November 11, 1982, Spencer was involved in a minor 
vehicle accident in Wyoming. He was briefly treated at the 
Memorial Hospital emergency room for head, arm and leg pain. 
(R. 94). Although Judge Allen found that Spencer was dis-
charged "a little dazed" (R. 304), the hospital record contains 
no such observation. (R. 94). The next night while going 
"extra slow" his truck went off an icy road. (R. 69). He has 
no memory of what happened. (R. 70). He was treated at the 
Vail Valley Medical Center for an abrasion of his scalp and 
hand. He was admitted for observation that night. The next 
morning he had a normal neurological examination and was 
discharged with asprin as the only medication. (R. 150). Upon 
returning to Salt Lake, X-rays, a C.T. Scan and an electro-
encephalogram (EEG) were performed. All were within normal 
limits. (R. 96, 98). 
In February 1983 he was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital 
again for observation. X-rays, a CT Scan, and an EEG were 
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repeated, again within normal limits. A psychiatric evaluation 
concluded that Spencer was having "hysterical conversion 
symptoms." (R. 155). Throughout his medical treatment Spencer 
complained of head and neck pain, and blackouts. However, 
examinations and tests were normal (R. 256). He continued 
under medical care until July 5, 1983 when he returned to 
work. (R. 73, 145). He was laid off by a reduction in force 
in September 1983. (R. 74). 
After being laid off, Spencer never returned to work. 
(R. 76). He continued treatment with Dr. Hebertson and 
received medication to control seizure disorders. When the 
medication failed to affect the seizures another EEG and CT 
scan were performed. Again, they were within normal limits. 
(R. 256, 257). 
On January 31, 1985, Spencer tripped, fell forward and 
caught himself with his arms. He did not strike his head. 
While on the ground he allegedly had a seizure. He was 
examined in the St. Mark's emergency room where his left wrist 
was x-rayed for a possible fracture. He was discharged in good 
condition. (R. 332). 
After a detailed review of the medical records and an 
extensive physical examination, the medical panel found 
[N]o evidence for structural disease or injury involv-
ing the central nervous system. We find no organic 
basis for the constant headaches, and no evidence that 
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a bona fide seizure disorder exists. Instead, the 
Medical Panel believes that the patient's symptoms are 
related to psychological function. (R. 258) 
The medical panel diagnosed a factitious seizure disorder. 
(R. 258). 
Spencer objected to the medical panel report claiming 
seizure episodes six to ten times per day lasting from one 
minute to three hours each. He also claimed the problem could 
be organic. (R. 268-271). Spencer also moved for a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability. (R. 272). In support 
of this motion, Spencer argued: 
1. He had a 32% permanent physical impairment from 
all conditions. 
2. He had only a fifth grade education and an 
alleged ten year mental age. 
3. The Social Security Administration had awarded 
him total disability benefits. 
4. He had not worked since November 12, 1982. 
(R. 274-283) 
Judge Allen accepted the evaluation and impairment rating 
of the medical panel over Dr. Hebertson's. (R. 304). He also 
rejected the motion for a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability on the following grounds: 
1. Of the 32% permanent impairment, 2% related to 
some amputed toes 18% related to a left shoulder 
injury which pre-existed this industrial acci-
dent. Spencer was able to work effectively with 
these disabilities. 
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2. Spencer was only 39 years old. 
3. He had been offered quite a few truck driving 
jobs since the accident. (R. 77). 
4. The only reason Spencer did not take the offered 
jobs was the alleged seizures which have no 
organic basis but are factitious. 
(R. 303-307). 
Spencer has never objected to Judge Allen's determination. 
Although Judge Allen did not discuss the Social Security 
Administration ("S.S.A.") determination of total disability, a 
review of it shows an acknowledgment of no objective or clini-
cal evidence to support Spencer's claim, but an acceptance of 
Dr. Hebertson's evaluation. No evaluation was made or reviewed 
along the lines of that submitted by the Industrial Commis-
sion's Medical Panel. (R. 285-290). 
On July 17, 1985, one month after Judge Allen's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were final, Spencer received 
an evaluation report from DRS. (R. 314-330). This evaluation 
accepted the premise of bona fide seizures (R. 314) which the 
Industrial Commission rejected. (R. 304-307). Using this 
mistaken premise, DRS concluded that Spencer was not a feasible 
candidate for rehabilitation. (R. 315). 
On January 1986, Spencer filed a report of Dr. Hebertson in 
support of his Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Motion 
of Review. (R. 367-370). Dr. Hebertson's report showed that 
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he examined Spencer only twice since the Original Order denying 
permanent total disability. His examinations showed that 
Spencer "might be having less seizures." (R. 368, 369). Dr. 
Hebertson also noted that after three years he still did not 
know what the problem was and whether it was of a "physical or 
psychological nature." (R. 369). No negative change in 
Spencer's condition was observed. (R. 367-370). 
On February 3, 1986, again in support of his Motion for 
Reconsideration of Denial of Motion for Review, Spencer sub-
mitted a March 1985 report from Dr. Legant. (R. 377-379). She 
noted that Spencer "appeared to be fairly comfortable although 
he claimed to be in pain during the appointment" and suggested 
a hysterical disorder. (R. 378). She too did not note any 
change in Spencer's condition. In concluding, she suggested: 
[T]hat there must eventually be an end to their quest 
for an answer to his problems, as it is sapping their 
energy and their finances. Perhaps it would be more 
constructive to redirect their energies toward 
learning to live with things as they are. (R. 378). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
To justify changing the Original Order finding no permanent 
total disability, Spencer must show some significant change or 
new development in his injury or proof of the Original Order's 
inadequacy. 
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Spencer had already presented the alleged "new" medical 
evidence before the Original Order was issued. Spencer had 
already presented the employment and education status before 
the Original Order was issued. Spencer had already presented 
the S.S.A.'s determination of total disability before the 
Original Order was entered. This determination was incomplete 
and premised on facts contrary to those found by the Industrial 
Commission. Although Spencer did not present the DRS report 
until a month after the Original Order became final, it, too, 
was incomplete and premised on facts contrary to those 
determined by the Industrial Commission. 
Spencer's entire argument rehashes matters considered and 
rejected by the Industrial Commission before the Original 
Order. It is simply a delinquent oblique attack on the 
Industrial Commission's well-reasoned and factually justified 
conclusion that Spencer's problems are artificial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAY 29, 1985, FINDINGS OF FACT, CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ARE FINAL AND MAY 
NOT BE CHANGED OR MODIFIED ABSENT A 
SIGNIFICANT CHANGE OR NEW DEVELOPMENT OR 
PROOF OF AN INADEQUATE AWARD. 
The Industrial Commission's May 29, 1985, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order determined that: 
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1. Spencer had a factitious (artificial or sham) 
seizure disorder rather than a bona fide or 
organic seizure disorder. 
2. Spencer had numerous opportunities to drive truck 
for pay. 
3. Since his problems were factitious and he had job 
opportunities, he was not permanently and totally 
disabled. 
(R. 303-307). 
Had Spencer disagreed with the Industrial Commission, a motion 
for review could have been filed as permitted by Utah Code Ann, 
§§ 35-1-82.54, 82.55. None was filed. Thus, the award of the 
commission became final. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.54. This 
uncontested order provides the starting point for the present 
inquiry. 
To modify or change the Original Order, Spencer must rely 
on Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over 
each case shall be continuing, and it may from time to 
time make such modification or change with respect to 
former findings, or orders with respect thereto, as in 
its opinion may be justified. . . . 
Invocation of this section requires "evidence of some signifi-
cant change or new development in the claimant's injury or 
proof of the previous award's inadequacy." Buxton v. 
Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1978). As 
explained in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
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19 Utah 2d 158, 427 P.2d 952, 953 (1967), absent such a show-
ing, the Industrial Commission commits reversible error if it 
modifies or changes its award. 
POINT II 
SPENCER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY SIGNIFI-
CANT CHANGE OR NEW DEVELOPMENT, OR PROOF OF 
AN INADEQUATE AWARD. 
Spencer argues for a new award on the following grounds: 
1. New medical evidence indicates a change in 
his injury. 
2. He has been unemployed since accident. 
3. The United States Department of Health and 
Human Services determined that he was totally disabled. 
4. The Division of Rehabilitation Services of 
the Utah State Office of Education concluded that he 
was not a feasible candidate for competitive employ-
ment. 
(Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 7, 8). A careful review of the facts 
show these claims to be erroneous. 
Before reviewing Spencer's claims in light of the facts, 
the basis of the Industrial Commission's original denial of 
permanent total disability must be reviewed. Spencer claimed a 
seizure disorder that prevented him from working. However, the 
numerous EEG's, CT scans, x-rays and other tests showed no 
objective evidence of such a disorder. The best medical evi-
dence Spencer could muster was Dr. Hebertson's opinion that he 
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did not know whether the problems were legitimate 
(R. 268-271). More than three years after the accident, 
Dr. Hebertson still could not decide whether the problem was 
legitimate (R. 369). The independent medical panel appointed 
by the Industrial commission carefully reviewed the medical 
records and examined Spencer. They concluded that the seizures 
were not legitimate. Spencer's problems were factitious—that 
is, artificial or sham. 
As a necessary foundation to ruling on the permanent total 
disability claim, the Industrial Commission had to make a 
factual determination of Spencer's medical condition. In 
weighing the medical evidence the total lack of objective 
evidence of a seizure disorder and the medical panel's 
well-reasoned conclusion that the problem was factitious stood 
solidly against Spencer's claims. The only medical evidence 
that is remotely close to a contrary opinion is Dr. Hebertson's 
uncertainty. The evidence rightfully compelled the conclusion 
that the seizures were artificial. 
Having made this determination, the Industrial Commission 
observed that Spencer was able to effectively work with the toe 
amputations and left shoulder problems prior to the accident 
and that his present "problem" was artificial. Regardless of 
his education, by his own admission, Spencer had numerous truck 
driving job opportunities if he would end his artificial 
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seizures. The Industrial Commission correctly concluded 
Spencer was not permanently and totally disabled. Spencer 
never challenged this decision. 
With this perspective, Spencer's present claims can be 
evaluated. 
A. The Alleged "New" Medical Evidence Had Already Been 
Presented And Considered. 
The only medical evidence Spencer offered prior to the 
second denial of his permanent total disability claim was a 
January, 1985 St. Marks emergency record (R. 331-335). Spencer 
claims that this shows his condition had escalated to grand mal 
seizures. First, this was not new medical evidence. The treat-
ment occurred four months before the Original Order. Second, 
this treatment was for a fall with a possible fractured left 
wrist. The treating physician was given a history of 
seizures—he did not diagnose such a problem (R. 332). And 
third, this was the same condition which Spencer proffered on 
his first application (R. 268-271) which the Industrial 
Commission rejected. It added nothing not already presented 
and considered. 
After the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission denied Spencer's claim for the second time, Spencer 
offered Dr. Legant's March, 1985 report (R. 377-379) and 
Dr. Hebertson's January, 1986 report (R. 367-371). 
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Like the St. Mark's record, Dr. Legant's report was made 
before the Original Order. Like the medical panel, Dr. Legant 
could find nothing organically wrong. She even suggested that 
the Spencers "end their quest" and learn "to live with things 
as they are" (R. 378). This only supports the Original Order. 
It added nothing not already presented and considered. 
Dr. Hebertson's report was made after the Original Order. 
It shows two examinations following the Original Order. The 
only change was a decrease in seizures. If anything, this 
shows medical improvement. Otherwise, the report outlines the 
same uncertain opinion rejected by the Industrial Commission in 
the Original Order. Again, it added nothing not already 
presented and considered. 
B. Since The Accident Spencer Has Been And Could Be 
Employed. 
When Dr. Hebertson could find nothing wrong with Spencer, 
he sent him back to work (R. 73, 145). Spencer continued to 
work until he was laid off in a reduction in force in 
September, 1983 (R. 74). Only then, and while still unable to 
produce objective medical evidence of seizures, did Spencer 
claim he could not work. This, too, was previously presented 
and considered. Between then and the Original Order, Spencer 
did not work. When he filed his second application, a month 
later, this had not changed. He has worked since the accident 
and, by his own admission, has job opportunities. (R. 77). 
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C. The Incomplete And Falsely Premised Determination Of 
The Social Security Administration Does Not Bind The 
Industrial Commission. 
As already noted, the S.S.A.'s Determination admits a lack 
of objective evidence of seizures. (R. 288.) S.S.A. made no 
evaluation like that of the medical panel. Simply put, the 
S.S.A. saw problems with Spencer's claim, but had no medical 
evidence contrary to Dr. Hebertson's uncertainty. The 
Industrial Commission suffered from no such deficit. A 
complete medical assessment by the medical panel based on 
compelling evidence refuted the uncertainty of the S.S.A. 
Having a complete picture, The Industrial Commission's 
determination obviously differed from that of the S.S.A. The 
Industrial Commission's decision was reasonable and supported 
by compelling evidence. The S.S.A.'s incomplete and falsely 
premised determination cannot bind the Industrial Commission as 
Spencer suggests. And, like all the other evidence, it had 
been previously presented and considered. 
D. The Incomplete And Falsely Premised Opinion Of The 
Division of Rehabilitation Services Does Not Bind The 
Industrial Commission. 
The DRS report assumes that Spencer's condition has 
remained static for some time. Thus, it shows no significant 
change or new development in the month between the order and 
the report. Like the S.S.A. determination, it also assumes 
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bona fide seizures. This is expected since Spencer did not 
submit to DRS for consideration the medical panel report, the 
Industrial Commission's order or his outstanding job offers. 
Like the S.S.A. determination, it rests on incomplete informa-
tion and assumptions rejected by the Industrial Commission. 
Being incomplete and falsely premised, it added nothing new. 
CONCLUSION 
Spencer's second application for permanent total disability 
filed only a month after the Original Order became final 
presented nothing new. The thrust of his claim remains the 
same--that he has bona fide seizures and thus cannot work. The 
medical evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates otherwise. The 
Industrial Commission considered all this evidence before enter-
ing its Original Order. Spencer never challenged it as arbi-
trary or capricious. The Industrial Commission has rightly 
determined that it may not relitigate the same matter. Plain-
tiff's Petition for Review should be denied. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
SCMHKC1 
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